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The punishment, it is commonly said, should fit the crime.1 The
question addressed by this Article is to what extent the punishment should
also fit the criminal.
For decades, criminal law scholars have endorsed the goal of
proportionate sentencing.2 The basic idea of proportionate sentencing is
that perpetrators of worse crimes should get harsher sentences. One might
imagine an equation in which sentences are expressed as a monotonically
increasing function of increasingly serious crimes. Crime severity, in turn,
is defined by a range of factors: the harm caused (if any), the actor's
mental state and mental capacity, the provoking circumstances, the
beneficial and harmful side-effects of the act, the nature of the causal
connection between the act and the harm, and so on. What is the nature of
these factors and how do they make the crime worse? The extensive
literature addressing these topics can be understood as exploring the crime
side of the crime-sentencing proportionality equation.
In contrast, much less attention has been paid to the sentencing side of
the crime-sentencing proportionality equation. Criminal offenders have
different backgrounds, tastes, perceptions, sensitivities, and adaptive
abilities. Because of this, different offenders will experience penal
sanctions, such as incarceration, differently. Some will find these
sanctions harsher and more oppressive than others; some less. How
closely should the law tailor its sanctions to the psychological and other
specific features of offenders? For example, should an offender's prison
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. I am grateful for the insightful comments and
helpful suggestions of Vera Bergelson, Mitchell Berman, Stuart Green, Adam Kolber, David Moss, Alice
Ristroph, Brad Roth, Vincent Wellman and Steven Winter. Any criticism-objective or subjective-should
be directed solely at the author.
1. See, e.g., W.S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, A More Human Mikado (1885) ("My object
all sublime / I shall achieve in time / To let the punishment fit the crime / The punishment fit the crime").
2. See, e.g., JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONAL PUNISHMENT 5 (2004) (noting the
"wide acceptance" of the proportionality principle among theorists); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionate
Punishments, in PRINCIPLED SENTENCING, 195-200 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds.,
1992); George P. Fletcher, Reflections on Felony Murder, 12 Sw. U. L. REV. 413, 426, 427-28 (1981-82)
(asserting that punishment is just only insofar as it is proportionate to fault and that basic principle of just
punishment is that it must be proportional to wrongdoing). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) ("The
general purposes of the provisions on sentencing, applicable to all official actors in the sentencing system,
are . . . to render sentences in all cases within a range of severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses,
the harms done to crime victims, and the blameworthiness of offenders"). Scholarly interest aside,




sentence be lower than average because, due to post-traumatic stress
disorder ("PTSD") or claustrophobia, he will subjectively suffer more in
prison than the average incarceree? Should an offender's sentence be
greater because she has been incarcerated multiple times in the past and
does not mind greatly the average sentence? Relatedly, incarcerated
persons will have different experiences in prison due to external factors.
For example, an inmate might be seriously assaulted by another inmate or
miss out on an unusually rich and satisfying life outside of prison. Should
that person's prison sentence be reduced on the grounds that hat person
has suffered more in prison or has been deprived of more than the average
offender?
Of course, before giving an affirmative answer to these questions, due
attention must be paid to the many practical and administrative concerns
that such close sanction-tailoring would raise. These concerns include
contrived sensitivities, costs of evaluation, privacy interests of offenders,
bias of decision makers, reduced deterrence, and public perceptions of
fairness. Some trade-off between these concerns and close sanction-
tailoring may well be called for. However, before trying to determine the
appropriate trade-off, it is first necessary to decide whether such close
tailoring would even be desirable in theory. Practical and administrative
concerns aside, do we want the punishment to fit the criminal?
This Article contends that criminal punishment generally should be
objectively measured and not take into account subjective and
idiosyncratic features of the criminal like those discussed above. This
position runs contrary to some recent writing in punishment theory. This
Article argues that insofar as punishment is a function of the desert of the
offender for committing a crime (1) criminal penalties should be based
only on wrongs recognized by the criminal law; (2) the wrongs recognized
by the criminal law are largely defined in objective terms; (3)
punishments for wrongs should mirror, to the extent possible, the wrongs
the offender is being punished for; (4) thus, criminal offenders are justly
punished by deprivations of objectively defined rights; and (5) because
they are secondary consequences of otherwise just penalties, incidental
subjective and idiosyncratic harms experienced by offenders are justified,
although in some cases reasonable mitigative measures may be
appropriate.
The Article is structured as follows. Section I considers some of the
existing literature on the problem of proportionate punishment, focusing
on the writings of Professor Adam Kolber. This Section reviews Kolber's
writings on subjectivity and baseline-relevance in the criminal law. It
considers Kolber's argument that a subjective and comparative version of
retributivism is the only reasonable form of retributivism, and this form,
coupled with a commitment to proportionality, leads to some intuitively
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unacceptable results. Therefore, retributivism must be rejected. Section II
presents and critiques some of the arguments that have been raised against
Kolber's position in favor of an objective theory of punishment. Finding
these arguments unpersuasive, Section II concludes that a superior theory
of objective punishment is needed.
The second half of the Article attempts to meet that need. Section
III presents a five-step argument (summarized above) for objective
retributivism. It then elaborates its implications and defends it against
some possible objections. Section IV considers the place of retributivism
in punishment heory in light of the theory of objective retributivism. This
Section argues that the objective form of retributivism set forth in this
Article can satisfy the relatively modest ambitions for a retributive theory
of punishment. This Article briefly concludes by situating its arguments
for objectivity both narrowly and broadly.
I. THE CASE FOR INDIVIDUALIZED RETRIBUTIVISM
This Section considers what I shall refer to as the theory of
"individualized retributivism." The case for individualized retributivism
was made by Professor Adam Kolber in a series of three articles.3 These
articles portray individualized retributivism as the most faithful or natural
version of retributivism. Unfortunately for retributivism, individualized
retributivism is, all things considered, an unappealing moral theory. Thus,
Kolber presents a reductio ad absurdum challenge to retributivism. Since
retributivism is a leading theory of punishment among contemporary
scholars,4 whether this reductio is sound is of considerable import.
In brief, Kolber argues for the claims that (1) the sorts of harms that
punishment theory must justify include both the intended and unintended
harms that offenders may suffer as a result of their sentences; (2) among
these unintended harms are the negative subjective experiences of the
offender; (3) furthermore, the severity of these unintended harms,
3. See Adam J. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, 18 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2012) (hereinafter
Kolber, Unintentional Punishment); Adam J. Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 182 (2009) (hereinafter Kolber, Subjective Experience); Adam J. Kolber, The
Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1565 (2009) (hereinafter Kolber, Comparative
Punishment). Besides the three articles focused on herein, Kolber has further elaborated his views in The
Experiential Future of the Law, 60 EMORY L.J. 585 (2011), and The Subjectivist Critique of
Proportionality (on file with author). See also Ryberg, supra note 1, at 102-09 (discussing the "sensibility
challenge"); John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan Masur, Happiness and Punishment, 76
U. CHI. L. REV. 1037, 1068-72 (2009) (making similar arguments).
4. See Alice Ristroph, Just Violence, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1017, 1038 (2014) ("For the past three or
four decades, retributivism has been especially prevalent among academic philosophers"); David Dolinko,
Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623 (1992) ("[R]etributivism ... has enjoyed
in recent years so vigorous a revival that it can fairly be regarded today as the leading philosophical
justification of the institution of criminal punishment.").
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whether objective deprivations of liberty or negative subjective
experiences, must be assessed relative to the offender's historical or
counterfactual baseline; (4) in order to achieve proportionate punishment
when harms are so assessed, factors such as the offender's economic class
and social background must be taken into account in a manner that
offends our normative sensibilities; (5) therefore retributivism should be
rejected.
Kolber's arguments are presented below in subsections A through C. I
elaborate them in some detail so the reader may appreciate their strong
pull and the commensurate need for a defense of retributivism.
A. A Retributivist Theory of Punishment Should Justify Unintended
Harms.
In "Unintentional Punishment,"5 Kolber challenges the traditional view
that the punishment suffered by an offender is limited to harms that were
intentionally inflicted. This view may be traced to H.L.A. Hart, who
canonically defined punishment as pain or other consequences normally
considered unpleasant that are intentionally imposed on an actual or
intended offender by an authority of the relevant legal system for an
offense against legal rules.6 Once this intentionality limit is removed, the
door is opened to a range of harms which Kolber later argues retributivism
cannot well account for.
Kolber believes that an offender's punishment, properly understood, is
not limited to harms intentionally imposed. Rather, punishment also
includes certain unintended harms; or at least such harms are relevant in
assessing a punishment's severity and justness.7 Kolber argues for this
conclusion by imagining two like offenders sentenced to identical prison
terms in identical facilities by different judges, one whose purpose is to
make the offender experience the full range of prison hardships (for
example, deprivations of liberty and severe ostracism within the prison
community), the other whose purpose is to make the offender experience
a narrow range of hardships (for example, only deprivations of liberty),
but who is aware that the offender will experience the full range of
hardships. According to Kolber, the judges' different intents are
irrelevant. The two offenders (both of whom are deprived of liberty and
are severely ostracized) receive equally harsh punishments.8 Kolber
5. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 3.
6. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 4
(1968).
7. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 3, at 12 ("[W]e count at least certain foreseen
inflictions as part of the severity of a sentence.")
8. Id. at 7-10.
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contends the same analysis would apply even if the intentions of some
other state actor, or collection of state actors, were thought to be relevant
in determining the scope of intended harms.9
Kolber then advances what he called the justification-symmetry
principle. According to this principle, whatever harms a private person
would have to justify inflicting, the state is also required to justify. Kolber
explains:
The principle derives from the very reason we seek to justify our
punishment practices. A justification must tell us the moral distinction
between a just punishment practice and similar-seeming criminal or
immoral behavior. When we can demand a moral justification from you or
me for harming someone, then we can make a symmetrical demand of
those who cause the same kind of harm in the name of just punishment.10
The justification-symmetry principle implies that the state must justify
not only the harms it intentionally causes through imposing penal
sanctions, but also the harms it knows it causes, the harms it is aware it
risks causing, and the harms it should know it risks causing." This is
because persons must also justify known, risked, and foreseeable harms,
or else be judged culpably indifferent, reckless, or negligent.
Furthermore, the state must justify not only the harms it imposes on
offenders while they are in prison, but also the harms that it causes after
the offender's sentence is over. 12 Finally, Kolber asserts that even harms
that are not proximately caused may need to be justified because "it is
hardly clear that a moral justification of punishment should have any
proximate-cause limitations at all." 13
The upshot of all of this is that a valid theory of punishment must justify
a lot of harms beyond simply the harms intended by the state actors
responsible for the sanction. Kolber claims that scholars of punishment
have largely failed to try to justify the unintended aspects of
punishment.14 This failure is particularly salient when it comes to
retributivism. Retributivism, in the context of criminal law, is a theory
that purports to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions. As discussed
in greater detail later in this Article,15 according to retributivism, an
actor's culpability for wrongdoing requires, provides a reason for, or at
least licenses punishment of the wrongdoer for the wrongdoing. Kolber
argues that since classic retributivism only attempts to justify intended
9. Id. at 10-12.
10. Id. at 14-15.
11. Id. at 16-19.
12. Id. at 21.
13. Id. at 19.
14. Id. at 13.
15. See infra subpart IILA.
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harms, it does only a slice of the needed justificatory work. Retributivism
cannot by itself justify the full practice of punishment since this practice,
like any real-world practice, will inevitably have intended and unintended
consequences.16 Believing that there are obstacles to supplementing
retributivism-for-intended-harms with either a desert-based or a
consequentialist theory for unintended harms, Kolber concludes that
traditional retributivism is an "extraordinarily anemic" theory.17
B. Retributivists Must Justify the Subjective Experience of Punishment
Assuming that any satisfactory theory of punishment must account for
both intended and unintended harms, the question remains what sorts of
unintended harms must be accounted for. In his article "The Subjective
Experience of Punishment,"18 Kolber argues that the subjective
experience of those subject to criminal sanctions must be taken into
account. This Article focuses on his arguments as they concern
retributivism.
Kolber's argument for the relevance of subjective experience is closely
related to the justification-symmetry principle. According to Kolber:
Any justification of punishment that ignores subjective experience . . . is
incomplete and doomed to fail. The reason is simple: One should not
purposefully or knowingly inflict substantial pain or distress on a person
without some justification for doing so. This principle applies to us in our
daily lives, as well as to state actors who sentence offenders or run prison
facilities. 19
Subjective experiences, such as pain, distress, anxiety, loneliness, and
depression, turn out to be a challenging class of harms to justify. Kolber
observes that individuals' experiences of punishment will differ. Some
will have a more negative experience to a given sentence than others.20 It
follows, Kolber argues, that retributivists must justify not only the typical
negative experiences, but those that are greater than typical as well.
Indeed, unless retributivists equalize the negativity of subjective
experiences for those who have committed offenses of equal seriousness,
they will have failed to punish proportionately.
Kolber draws an analogy to corporal punishment. If electric shocks
16. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 3, at 24.
17. Id.
18. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3.
19. Id. at 196-97.
20. Id. at 185 n.2. Bentham lists thirty-two factors that vary from person to person and that may
affect a person's experience of a given penal sanction. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS
AND LEGISLATION ch. 6, § 6 (1781) (mentioning, among others, health, education and rank).
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were imposed as punishment for crimes, as some have advocated,2 1 and
the severity of the shock for a given voltage varied with the physical size
of the subject, a retributivist would presumably require that smaller
offenders get smaller voltage shocks to preserve the proportionality of the
punishment. A smaller person being shocked at the voltage level of a
typical person would not be justified.22 Likewise, Kolber imagines the
punishment of "dieting." When dieting is imposed on an offender, their
calorie intake for the day is limited to 1000 calories. Given differences in
metabolism and size, some offenders would find this punishment
tolerable; others debilitating. Given this variation, Kolber claims that
offenders subjected to dieting would not be punished equally in a morally
relevant respect.23 Kolber argues that under retributivism, differences in
personality and psychology that lead to negative experiences of prison
should be treated the same as physical differences when it comes to
electric shocks and dieting. Just as punishment should be tailored to
physical differences, so should they be tailored to psychological
differences. Kolber notes that what people principally find adverse about
the prospect of incarceration are the feelings of loneliness, isolation,
anxiety, intimidation, loss of autonomy, and so on.24 Thus, it is these
subjective responses that really must be equalized if actors of equal
blameworthiness are to receive equal punishments.
Kolber acknowledges that sentencing based on individualized,
subjective calibrations may have counterintuitive consequences. For
example, Paris Hilton, who has enjoyed a very high standard of living,
may plausibly have a harder time adjusting to prison conditions than the
average person.25 A person like Paris Hilton, citing principles of
proportionality and retributivism, would seem to have a claim to a shorter
prison sentence because of the atypically great negative subjective
experience they would have in prison.26 Noting the counterintuitive nature
of this conclusion, Kolber remarks, "So much the worse perhaps for
proportional retributivism. "27
21. See GRAEME NEWMAN, JUST AND PAINFUL: A CASE FOR THE CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF
CRIMINALS (1983).
22. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 201.
23. Id. at 190.
24. Id. at 203.




26. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3,at 231.
27. Id. at 231. See also id. at 236 ("If one finds unacceptable the implications of proportional,
retributive punishment when subjective experience is taken seriously, then my claims can be viewed as
providing a reductio-style argument against certain forms of retributivism.")
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C. Retributivists Must Take Baseline Differences Into Account
Finally, in "The Comparative Nature of Punishment,"2 8 Kolber again
considers the question of how to understand the harms that must be
justified when the state imposes penal sanctions like incarceration.
Having previously argued that the subjective effects of sanctions must be
considered,2 9 Kolber further contends that the offenders' baseline liberty,
as well as baseline subjective well-being, must be taken into account.
According to Kolber, "The true severity of incarceration depends on the
ways in which prison changes an offender's life." 30 Specifically, it is the
change between (a) the offender's historical or counterfactual baseline,
and (b) the actual state of affairs resulting from the imposition of penal
sanctions which determines punishment severity for proportionality
purposes.
Kolber begins by observing that harms are measured comparatively in
the context of torts and contracts. In torts, a claim for negligent damage
to property is based on the difference in value of the property before and
after the negligent act. Likewise, in an action for breach of contract,
damages are based on the difference between the defendant's actual
condition and what it would have been if the contract had not been
breached.31 Turning to punishment, Kolber argues that an individual
suffers the same harm while involuntarily confined by an abductor or
imprisoned by the state. The justification for each would require the
justification for the same set of comparatively understood harms.32 Kolber
also appeals to our practice of monetary fines, which are comparative
insofar as they move a defendant a fixed distance from one wealth level
to another rather than uniformly reducing a defendant to a given wealth
level. According to Kolber, "Those who would defend the absolute
conception of punishment severity must explain why our method of
assessing harm changes depending on the method of punishment at
issue."33 Kolber also observes that, for the most part, compensation for
erroneous conviction is determined by traditional comparative
measures.34 This also supports his thesis that harm severity for
punishment justification purposes should be measured comparatively.
Measuring punishment comparatively has implications for both the
objective and subjective aspects of punishment. Consider first the
28. Kolber, Comparative Punishment, supra note 3.
29. See Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at Part I.A.
30. Kolber, Comparative Punishment, supra note 3,at 1566.
31. Id. at 1572-73.
32. Id. at 1574-75.
33. Id. at 1575.
34. Id. at 1577-79.
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objective component of punishment-deprivation of liberty. Kolber
argues that whether the liberties are assessed in factual, legal, or idealized
terms, some persons (depending on resources, jurisdiction, or status) have
more liberty than others.35 "Civilians have liberties of movement that
soldiers and people in quarantine lack. Eighteen-year-olds have rights to
vote that seventeen-year-olds lack." 36 Likewise, "Rich people have rights
to use particular property that poor people lack." 37 Incarceration
uniformly denies these liberties to all offenders. From this it follows that
"all else being equal, civilians are punished more severely than soldiers
or people in quarantine, eligible voters are punished more severely than
those who are ineligible (in jurisdictions where inmates lose their voting
rights), and rich people are punished more severely than poor people."38
Kolber extends his argument from objective liberties to subjective
experiences. Kolber believes that, in like manner, offenders who start off
on a higher subjective baseline of satisfaction and receive a sentence
resulting in a given level of unhappiness, U, receive a more severe
sentence than those starting at a lower level who end up at U.39 Kolber
concedes that taking baseline subjective experiences into account
generally makes less of a difference than taking baseline liberties into
account due to "hedonic adaptation"-the psychological tendency for
changes in environment to have a negative effect on happiness level over
time.40 However, he argues that even if not as significant as objective
differences, differences in subjective baselines must be taken into account
by any satisfactory justification of punishment.
Once again, these considerations place the retributivist in an
uncomfortable position. Desert-based theories like retributivism, Kolber
claims, cannot punish proportionally unless they adopt penal practice
such as lengthening sentences for defendants with lower liberty baselines,
for example, those subject o general curfews. Such practices are foreign
to our penal system.41 Furthermore, the "Paris Hilton Problem" rises again
in another guise. Not only is a celebrity like Paris Hilton abnormally
sensitive to prison conditions but incarcerating her deprives her of more
liberty than others because of her higher baseline level. The rich,
generally speaking, enjoy a greater range of freedom and a higher level
of contentment than the poor. Therefore, jailing Paris Hilton for a fixed
time probably harms her more in the comparative sense than placing a
35. Id. at 1567-68.
36. Id. at 1567.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1567-68.
39. Id. at 1598.
40. Id. at 1599.
41. Id. at 1592.
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poor person in jail. Noting that "many people are understandably troubled
by the idea that he better-off offender should get a shorter prison sentence
than a worse-off offender who is equally blameworthy,"4 2 Kolber
concludes that "the comparative view of punishment challenges the
notion of punishment proportionality that underlies the retributive
justification of punishment."43
In sum, between the claims that (1) retributivists must account for
unintended aspects of sentences, (2) these aspects include deprivations of
subjective happiness as well as liberty, and (3) the severity of these
deprivations is to be measured from the offender's baseline, the
retributivist who wants to maintain proportionality in punishment is
backed into tight corner.
II. SOME (UNPERSUASIVE) OBJECTIONS TO INDIVIDUALIZED
RETRIBUTIVISM
Under individualized retributivism, a punishment's severity is to be
assessed based on the offender's subjective experience of incarceration as
well as his objective deprivation of liberty, and both are to be measured
against the offender's historical or counterfactual baseline. This Article
will now review some objections in the literature to Kolber's arguments
that individualized retributivism is the most faithful and natural form of
retributivism. This Article views these criticisms as unpersuasive.
A. Simons' Objections
Professor Kenneth Simons, in his article "Retributivists Need Not and
Should Not Endorse the Subjectivist Account of Punishment,"44 responds
to Kolber. According to Simons, "the state is not morally responsible for
all hypersensitive, or for all hyperinsensitive, reactions to punishment,
even if those reactions are entirely predictable and indeed predicted....
The state's responsibility is simply to ensure that he punishment that it
directly inflicts is proportionate to desert."4 5 Simons explains that "causal
structure of action and consequences matters to responsibility."46 For
example, Simons likens causing an offender atypical subjective harms to
depriving an offender's family of emotional and financial support, the
latter of which he assumes the state is not morally responsible for. But
42. Id. at 1569.
43. Id. at 1570.
44. Kenneth W. Simons, Retributivists Need Not and Should Not Endorse the Subjectivist Account
of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1 (2009).
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id.
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Simons does not explain what causal structure associated with the
production of an offender's subjective harm renders the state not
responsible for the harm. Granted, if an offender felt anxiety and guilt
from learning of the setbacks their family experienced due to their
incarceration, such feelings might be ignored as an unduly indirect effect
of incarceration. These feelings, after all, are a step removed from the
setbacks themselves. However, the general feelings of separation and
isolation experienced by offenders are much more direct results of
incarceration. Likewise, Simon postulated that religious conversion
resulting in a net positive conviction experience might be ignored by a
proportionate retributivist since such a conversion would likely be
triggered by an intervening event. In contrast, the causal linkage between
the conditions of confinement and the experience of confinement-the
focus of Kolber's argument-seems as close a connection as any.
Causation cannot justify ignoring the subjective experience of
punishment.
Simons also argues that subjective experience is not relevant by
considering an "experience machine."47 Hooking up an offender to such
a theoretical machine would produce in the offender the illusion of having
spent ten years in prison and of not having seen his family or friends for
ten years. Simons argues that under such circumstances, the offender
would not have been duly punished, the offender's subjective experiences
notwithstanding. But that intuition can be explained on the ground that
experiencing an illusory ten-year deprivation of liberty for five minutes is
not as bad as a subjective experience of liberty deprivation that is actually
endured for ten years, especially because after being released from the
machine, the offender would presumably learn that the experience was an
illusion and retrospectively minimize the experience.
Finally, Simons argues that subjectivism cannot account for the view
that the death penalty is the harshest punishment since it is implausible
that the death penalty caused more subjective suffering than decades in
prison serving a life sentence.48 But the subjectivist view need not be
narrowly construed as measuring punishment based on actual experience.
An executed person is deprived of potentially decades of subjective
experience that, while possibly including many negative elements, is
usually a net positive experience.49 A broader theory that takes into
47. Id. at 4-5.
48. Id. at 6.
49. Simons also argues that a subjective form of retributivism suffers from difficulties such as
unclearness about what subjective states matter and uncritical reliance of the notion of disutility. But these




account such subjective deprivations both explains the intuitive harshness
of the death penalty and is properly characterized as subjectivist.
B. Markel 's Objections
Professors Daniel Markel and Chad Flanders responded to Kolber in
"Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to Retributive
Justice."50 In this article, Markel and Flanders present a version of
retributivism called "the Confrontational Conception of Retribution."
Under this version, "the value of retribution lies in the criminal's ability
to understand rationally the state's desire to repudiate his wrongful claim
to be above the law."51 Thus, "what retributivists ought to care about
foremost is the imposition of the punishment as a communication directed
at the offender, not the offender's idiosyncratic and variable reaction to
the coercive condemnatory deprivation."5 2  Markel and Flanders
recognize certain subjectively-based limits to punishment: "To literally or
psychologically break or destroy a person under the aegis of retributive
punishment would violate the offender's dignity, and, in a democracy, our
own."53 Therefore, sanctions would be adjusted in light of the offender's
particular psychological make-up in order to not breach dignity. Markel
and Flanders also recognize that to be an appropriate subject of state
punishment, offenders must have the mental capacity to understand they
are being punished. But Markel's and Flanders' concessions to
subjectivism extend no further.
Markel and Flanders fail to blunt the force of individualized
retributivism. According to them, "What matters is the offender's
understanding that he is being coerced to endure some hard sanction.",4
But what if the offender is aware that the coercing authority recognizes
the offender does not experience the sanction as a hardship; or even that
the coercing authority is uninterested in whether the offender experiences
the sanction as harsh? Rather than understanding the sanction as a
message of condemnation, the offender would understand the authority as
simply going through the motions, unconcerned with the message
conveyed. A telegram to the offender stating "You are hereby most
severely condemned," would equally fail to deliver. Communicative
intent is inferred from expected impact along all relevant dimensions.
Likewise, Markel and Flanders write, "In the case of liberty deprivations,
50. Dan Markel & Chad Flanders, Bentham on Stilts: The Bare Relevance of Subjectivity to
Retributive Justice, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 907 (2010).
51. Id. at 933.
52. Id. at 947.
53. Id. at 958.
54. Id. at 956.
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the state reduces [the offender's] autonomy to act, move, and interact with
others. Whether he suffers more or less than another person is less
important than the content of the message sent through the removal of or
restrictions upon his liberty or property." 5 5 But surely the content of the
message cannot be divorced from the degree of suffering. 56 The message
the state should be conveying on Markel's and Flanders' version of
retributivism is not simply that the offender's conduct was wrongful, but
also how wrongful it was. To do this requires a more carefully calibrated
message. There must be proportionality. When it comes to
proportionality, Markel and Flanders comment, "Our view is that in a
liberal democracy proportionality is also a function of reasonable reason-
giving for matching appropriate means with appropriate ends. A more
precise description is properly left to democratic decision-making."5 7
They note that proportionality based on suffering would draw prison
officials too deeply into sadism. But practical issues aside, they do not
explain why proportionality should be objectively rather than subjectively
calibrated. Markel and Flanders write that "offenders are largely
responsible for the foreseeable effects of their punishments on
themselves,"5 8 but do not explain why the state does not at least share
responsibility, given that negative psychological effects of incarceration
are readily foreseeable and result directly from imprisonment.
C. Gray's Objections
In his article "Punishment as Suffering," 59 Professor David Gray
rejects an individualized account of punishment in favor of an objectivist
one. Gray believes Kolber's notion of punishment is flawed insofar as it
asserts that a wide range of factors is relevant to assessing a punishment's
severity. Gray takes issue, for example, with Kolber's view that a
retributivist theory of punishment justifying our actual punishment
system would give a retributivist justification of the suffering that an
inmate might experience from an assault by another inmate. Under such
an account, the offender's suffering may or may not be deserved.
According to Gray, such suffering is not punishment and, thus, a
retributivist account of punishment need not address it. For Gray,
"retributivism defines punishment as a restraint on liberty or other
55. Id. at 974-75.
56. See RYBERG, supra note 2, at 106-07 ("[I]f what matters ... is that a means is used which
makes it possible to reach the criminal ... then it certainly seems reasonable to expect that it is the actual
impact on the person that matters.").
57. Markel, supra note 50, at 963.
58. Id. at 975.
59. David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REv. 1619 (2010) (hereinafter Gray,
Punishment as Suffering).
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consequence that is determined and justified objectively by reference to a
culpable offense."60 Although Gray appeals to our intuitions about
punishment, he recognizes that his disagreement with Kolber regarding
the nature of punishment-whether it is a matter of liberty deprivation or
subjective suffering-has a large "semantic" element to it.6 1 For example,
both Kolber and Gray agree on the substantive issue that having sentences
turn on the offender's wealth is normatively distasteful. They disagree,
however, on whether that is a strike against retributivism generally
(Kolber's claim) or just the individualized version of it (Gray's claim)
because of a largely definitional disagreement about the nature of
retributivism. Gray defends his understanding of retributivism, asserting
that "[m]ost serious and sophisticated theories of retributive justice are
objective rather than subjective."62 His assertion, however, is unsupported
by his citations.63 Retributivists for the most part have not directly
addressed the merits of objective versus individualized punishment.
The writings of Immanuel Kant are the only works that Gray examines
60. Id. at 1658.
61. Id. at 1653.
62. Id.at 1669.
63. Gray cites Robert Nozick, Herbert Morris, George Fletcher, John Rawls, Joel Fineberg, Carlos
Nino and Jean Hampton as retributivists holding an objective view of punishment. Gray, supra note 59,
at 1664-65. To the extent Nozick takes a position on the objectivity of punishment, he appears to reject
objectivism in favor of a view that takes into account the economic situation of the offender. See ROBERT
NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 363-65 (1981) (implying poor offenders for whom providing
compensation would be more burdensome should face a lesser penalties). Morris rejects the notion that
the purpose of punishment is to realize retributive justice, and, to the extent he may be characterized as a
retributivist, appears to deny that only that the "desire [for] punishment" is irrelevant in determining the
appropriate degree of deprivation. Herbert Morris, A Paternalistic Theory of Punishment, 18 AM. PHIL.
Q. 263, 264, 270 (1981). Fletcher endorses an objective view of punishment, but only as a conceptual
truth about the term "punishment," not as a normative matter of retributive justice. GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL VOLUME ONE:
FOUNDATIONS 228 (2007) (following HART, supra note 6, at 4). Rawls, no retributivist, understands penal
sanctions as a "stabilizing device" for society, rather than an element of a retributive scheme, and oes
not consider whether objective or individualized punishments would have a greater stabilizing effect.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 241 (1971). Joel Feinberg rejects the core principle of retributivism
that punishment should be a function of blameworthiness. JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Theory of
Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 116-17 (1974). Furthermore, his expressive theory f punishment
appears to contemplate that the hard treatment constitutive of punishment will be cashed out in subjective
terms, such as pain. Id. at 118. (concluding, "Pain should match guilt only insofar as its infliction is the
symbolic vehicle of public condemnation."). Nino too can hardly be described as a retributivist since he
explicitly disavows the blameworthiness of the offender as a condition or factor relevant to the
justification of punishment. See Carlos Nino, A Consensual Theory of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT: A
PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER 94, 105 (A. John Simmons, et al. eds., 1995). In any case, his
consent-based theory seems equally compatible with objective and individualized theories of
punishments. Finally, Hampton, by defining punishment as "disruption of the freedom to pursue the
satisfaction of one's desires," makes the existence and degree of punishment a function of the offender's
desires, and thus appears to adopt, or at least not to reject, an individualized theory of punishment. Jean
Hampton, The Moral Education Theory of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS READER 112, 128 (A. John Simmons, et al. eds., 1995).
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in any depth to support his claim that the best understanding of
retributivism implies an objective theory of punishment. Gray's reliance
on Kant for a substantive defense of objective retributivism, however, is
unpersuasive. Exactly what Kant's theory of punishment is, or whether
he even has such a theory, is a matter of scholarly controversy.64 On
Gray's view, Kantian punishment heory starts with Kant's general theory
of morals. According to Gray, wrongdoing for Kant is a matter of
engaging in conduct that violates the categorical imperative, i.e., cannot
be universalized. For example, theft-taking property without
permission-is not conduct based on a maxim that can be universalized
because, if everyone were to steal, the very institution of property would
crumble. Thus, there would be no property of another for the thief to take
and make their own. This contradiction must be resolved through
punishment, and "[t]he terms of that resolution are contained within the
maxim of the crime upon which the offender himself acts." 65 Thus,
carrying the logical contradiction to its natural end requires society to
"impos[e] the consequences of that contradiction on the offender." 66 For
example, "the proper legal punishment for an act of theft is to deny the
offender access to property in a form and to a degree commensurate with
his offense." 67
The problem here is that similar Kantian reasoning can be applied
subjectively and comparatively. Acting in a manner that significantly
decreases another's subjective sense of material security by, for example,
stealing is also a maxim that cannot be universalized. If all people
significantly decreased others' subjective sense of material security, there
would exist no sense of material security left to be decreased. In response
to such conduct, society would be compelled to decrease the offender's
sense of material security to a proportionate degree through, for example,
a penal environment of the appropriate type. For the environment to have
the requisite effect on the offender, individualized features of the offender
relevant to his response to the environment would have to be taken into
account. While Gray asserted that for Kant, "punishment is the objectively
determined, logical consequence of a crime imposed upon an offender by
the state," 68 Gray presented no argument for limiting Kantian
retributivism to objectively defined wrongs and punishments.
Subjectivism and objectivism are equally compatible with Kantianism.
64. See, e.g., Jane Johnson, Revisiting Kantian Retributivism to Construct a Justification of
Punishment, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 291 (2008) (discussing standard, limited and revised accounts of Kant's
views on punishment); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
509 (1987) (questioning whetherKant's views are coherent and consistent enough to qualify as a theory).
65. Gray, supra note 59, at 1663.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1664-65.
68. Id. at 1664 (italics added).
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This, however, is only half the story when it comes to the consequences
of penal sanctions. Having concluded that, under retributivism (properly
understood), subjective suffering is not part of the punishment, Gray
admits that "suffering matters." 69 While not punishment per se, suffering
is incidental to punishment. Gray spends little time discussing how it is
justifiable to cause such suffering, even if incidentally, but allows that the
existence of such suffering "may well provide good reason" for a reduced
prison sentence if, for example, it is excessive.70 The key, according to
Gray, is not to conceptualize such results in terms of desert-based limits
on punishment. Rather, "mercy and other important principles within the
penumbra of justice are sufficient and better guides." 71
The difficulty with Gray's argument here, however, is that mercy
seems inappropriate to invoke in this context. A judge sentencing an
offender for a technical violation of the law, for example, should refrain
from imposing the highest possible sentence within the permissible
sentencing range not out of mercy, but simply on the ground that such a
sentence is not deserved given the technical nature of the violation.
Likewise, legislators should not refrain from establishing a penalty of ten
years in prison for a traffic violation based on mercy. Such a penalty is
simply unjust and unjustified. As a conceptual matter, mercy seems
appropriate to invoke only in the face of an otherwise permissible
punishment.72 Thus, until Gray explains how the state might justifiably
cause offenders a given level of subjective suffering, the invocation of
mercy to reduce subjective suffering is premature.
Nor does Gray identify the "the important principles within the
penumbra of justice" that might alternatively explain why the sanctions
called for by objective retributivism need not be imposed.73 Gray admits
that "a particular technology may consistently produce incidental
suffering beyond an acceptable or remediable threshold." 74 In such cases,
"prudence" may provide normative a ground for modifying the practice.
But Gray provides no suggestion for determining such a threshold, nor for
elaborating the content of prudence. In short, Gray fails to respond to
Kolber's challenge for a retributivist justification of our punishment
practices, which inevitably produce suffering and differential
deprivations of liberty.
69. Id. at 1692.
70. Id.
71. Id..
72. See Heidi M. Hurd, The Morality of Mercy, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 389 389 (2007) (defining
mercy as "a properly motivated suspension of just deserts"); John Tasioulas, Repentance and the Liberal
State, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487, 500 (stating mercy "is a source of pro tanto (or defeasible) reasons for
punishing [offenders] less harshly than they deserve").
73. Gray, supra note 59, at 1692.
74. Id.
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In sum, neither Simons, Markel and Flanders, nor Gray present a
retributivist theory of punishment that adequately meets Kolber's
challenge to retributivism.
III. AN ARGUMENT FOR OBJECTIVE PUNISHMENT
This Section presents the argument for an objective, non-
individualized version of retributivism. This Section presents the
argument in five steps. In parts A through D, I present an affirmative
vision of retributivism which entails an objective theory of punishment.
In part E, I present a derivative justification and a residual justification
for the individualized aspects of punishment not accounted for in my
affirmative theory.
A. Retributivism
The first step of the argument for an objective, non-individualized
version of retributivism involves characterizing retributivism generally
and presenting a paradigmatic version of it.
1. Generally
Retributivism is many things to many people. At its core is the
proposition that wrongdoers deserve punishment for their wrongdoing; or
equivalently, that the wrongdoing of the wrongdoer justifies the
wrongdoer's punishment.75 In contrast, consequentialist theories of
punishment are theories about the relation of punishment to its
consequences, e.g., punishment is justified if the cost associated with it
outweigh the benefits that flow from it.
The characterization of retributivism as a theory about the relation of
wrongdoing to punishment has the virtue of remaining neutral among
different versions of retributivism. Different versions might entail
different explanations of why wrongdoing justifies punishment or how
much punishment is appropriate for a given offense. Since punishment is
to be justified by wrongdoing, it is a short step to the view that punishment
is to be proportionate to wrongdoing-the greater the wrongdoing, the
greater the punishment that is justified. But such a step is not necessary.
A theory that all wrongdoing should receive the same punishment because
75. It has been suggested that retributivism can be stated without the "mysterious" term "desert"
by appealing to the concept of intrinsic good: It is intrinsically good that wrongdoers are punished
proportionately to their wrongdoing. See Mitchell Berman, Two Kinds of Retributivism, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 438-39 (discussing retributivism in the context of
suffering theories of retributivism).
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"a wrong is wrong" would still be a retributivist theory, albeit a highly
counterintuitive one.
Retributivism also leaves open the nature of wrongdoing and
punishment. Most retributivists hold that wrongdoing is a matter of harm-
causing or harm-risking conduct (or rights violating or rights-risking
conduct) coupled with some form of culpability or responsibility for the
conduct. Retributivism, however, implies no specific theory of
wrongdoing. Retributivists are, qua retributivists, not committed to a view
on whether abortion, prostitution, suicide, insider trading, or blackmail is
wrongful conduct that might permit or require a retributive response.76 Of
course, without a theory of wrongdoing, retributivism could never be
operationalized. Applying retributivism thus necessitates a theory of
wrongdoing even though the theory does not encompass one. In like
measure, retributivists are not committed to a view of what constitutes
punishment. Retributivists need a theory of punishment that establishes
what counts as punishment and how it is to be measured. Retributivism,
however, no more includes any such theory than it includes a theory of
wrongdoing. Thus, a particular brand of retributivism might be
understood as saying, "whatever acts constitute wrongdoing and whatever
impositions constitute punishment, those acts and impositions should be
related in this particular way."
2. Lex Talionis
On one hand, one particularly pure expression of retributivism is the
lex talionis version. According to lex talionis-literally "the law of
retaliation"-the punishment a wrongdoer should receive is the very harm
that wrongdoer imposed on the victim. The relation between wrongdoing
and punishment is some form of identity. Like other moral theories,
retributivism has its roots in emotions and intuitions, as well as in reason
and principle. To the extent we have retributivist emotions and intuitions,
they follow lex talionis. There is a satisfaction in the thought of the
wrongful blow delivered by the actor ultimately falling on the actor
himself. To the extent that retributivism has a basis in reason (for
example, Kant's arguments for punishing wrongdoers77), the basis
76. See Jeremy Waldron, Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REv. 25, 44 (1992) (hereinafter Waldron, Lex
Talionis) ("[T]he proponent of [lex talionis] is no more committed than the rest of us to the view that
punishment is appropriate for an action like blackmail"). Likewise, a retributivist is not committed to
particular theory of culpability or excuse. Indeed, it would not be a contradiction for a retributivist to
accept an expansive theory of excuse, such as "rotten social background," under which only light penal
sanctions were deserved, or even a maximal theory of excuse under which all wrongdoing was excused
on the ground of physical determinism.
77. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (1792), in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353
(Mary Gregor ed. & trans., 1996).
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supports lex talionis.78 Or perhaps the more general principle of
reciprocity underlies retributivism, and the purest form of reciprocity is
lex talionis.9
On the other hand, no retributivist today defends a "full blooded"
version of lex talionis in either its traditional or negative versions.80 No
one advocates for a literal application of "an eye for an eye." First, there
are obviously practical, utilitarian considerations that limit the principle
of lex talionis. Burning down an offender's home as punishment for an
act of arson might be suggested by lex talionis, but actually implementing
such a punishment might risk the destruction of nearby homes or the
entire neighborhood. All things considered, it would be a bad idea. As
Jeremy Waldron has recognized, imposing a sexual attack on a sex
offender as punishment may encourage "nasty sadism and sexual
corruption ... of the officials involved."8 1 Likewise, torturing the torturer
violates the dignity of both offender and the state agent. Dignity is
valuable and, therefore, considerations of dignity act as a counterweight
to lex talionis.82 More generally, there has been a movement in our penal
system away from punishing by inflicting harms, for example, through
corporal punishment. Instead of imposing harms, our system places
offenders in circumstances that dramatically limit their potential for
achieving value in their lives. This movement may be understood as based
on dignity concerns that qualify a literal interpretation of lex talionis.83
78. Jeremy Waldron has theorized that lex talionis may rest on Kantian universalization, stating
"[r]espect for the criminal's agency is thought to require us to act toward him in light of the
universalization of what we take to be the maxim of his action in committing the crime." Waldron, Lex
Talionis, supra note 76, at 33.
79. Reciprocity might seem to require that "rightdoers" be rewarded for their good deeds. But
insofar as doing right implies being motivated by the desire to do right, the fulfillment of that desire may
be understood as the due reward. In contrast, punishment is appropriate for wrongdoers who obtain
satisfaction from having engaged in their intended wrongful conduct. Rightdoers deserve the smiles on
their faces; wrongdoers deserve to have their smiles wiped off.
80. Under a traditional version of retributivism, wrongdoing justifies punishment. Under a
negative, or limited version, wrongdoing licenses punishment, but nonretributive considerations, such as
deterrence or reformation, justify it. See Alec Walen, Retributive Justice, , THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL., June 18, 2014, § 3, available at
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/justice-retributive/..
81. Waldron, Lex Talionis, supra note 76, at 38.
82. Accord Walen, Retributive Justice, supra note 80, § 4.3.3 ("[P]roportionality should rule out
certain punishments on the ground that they are disproportionately large. But there is no reason for
retributivists not to look to other criteria, such as respect for human dignity, to prohibit those forms of
punishment that seem cruel or degrading.").
83. I do not see the qualifications discussed above as a repudiation of the intuitions and principles
that might support lex talionis, but rather as a sensible understanding that retributive justice is not the only
thing of value in the world. See LEO ZAIBERT, RETHINKING PUNISHMENT (2018) (proposing that
retributive justice is a value within a pluralist axiological universe). Equality, mercy, distributional justice,
social welfare, to name a few, are also valuable. Some, like Kant, may adhere to an absolutist view of
retributivist justice. See IMMANUEL KANT, General Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, in THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF
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One way of accommodating the practical and dignitary concerns
expressed above is through the process of abstraction. As Jeremy Waldron
has noted, the idea of literally subjecting a wrongdoer to the very
wrongful act they committed is nonsensical. 84 If Jones assaulted Smith at
noon, June 30, 2019, Jones cannot himself be punished by subjecting him
to an assault at noon, June 30, 2019. And if Smith was wearing a polka
dot shirt at the time, there is no need that a polka dots shirt play any role
in Jones's punishment. Rather, some abstracting of Jones's act is
necessary under lex talionis. The abstract description of Jones's act might
run from the relatively concrete "assaulting a shirt-wearing person during
the day" to the relatively abstract "acting in a manner that interfered with
an interest of another." Likewise, as Waldron has noted, acts that are
wrongful have many wrongful features. To borrow an example, the killing
of another is wrong not only because it is the most severe deprivation of
autonomy, but also because "it contributes to fear and insecurity, it
deprives dependents of their support and relatives of their loved one, it
causes grief, it reduces the GNP, it disrupts whatever projects the victim
was working on, etc." 85 Thus, the principle of lex talionis in application
has wider play, both vertically (the degree of abstraction) and horizontally
(the aspect of wrongfulness), than the traditional "eye for an eye"
formulation might suggest. However, lex talionis requires, to the extent
possible, that abstract features of the wrongdoing be imposed on the
wrongdoer to a degree that an abstract equivalence between wrong and
sanction is achieved. Under lex talionis, the question remains open what
abstract features of the wrong are to be imposed. The next part will focus
on this question.
B. The Principle of Legality and the Scope of Wrongdoing
The second step of the argument for an objective, non-individualized
version of retributivism is to invoke the principle of legality as a general
limit on the wrongs for which the state may punish. In a state of nature, it
has been argued, all individuals may justly punish acts of wrongdoing.86
The nature and scope of punishments that may be imposed in such a state
is a matter of retributive justice or, more generally, moral theory. Moral
theory, in conjunction with practical constraints, would determine the
RIGHT 198 (W. Hastie trans., 2002) ("Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent
of all its members . . . the last Murderer lying in prison ought to be executed before the resolution was
carried out."). The most plausible view of retributivism is that desert is highly relevant to determining
how an offender should be treated, but it is not the only thing relevant. See infra Part IV.
84. Waldron, Lex Talionis, supra note 76, at 32.
85. Id. at 41.
86. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION
103-04, 314 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale University Press 2003) (1689).
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abstract features of a wrongdoing to be imposed by a wrongdoer. In
contrast, what abstract features of a wrongdoing may legally be imposed
on a wrongdoer is not entirely a question of moral philosophy. Because it
is the state that is doing the punishing, it is also a question of political
philosophy.
Political philosophy examines the nature, power, and authority of the
state as it relates to the rights and liberties of its citizens. Among the
principles that limit state power is the legality principle. According to this
principle, conduct may not be treated as criminal unless it has been so
defined by the state at the time the conduct occurs.87 The principle of
legality is generally regarded as the first principle of criminal law.88 It has
been described as one of the most "widely held value-judgment[s] in the
entire history of human thought."89 It has deep roots in our legal culture.90
On first blush, the legality principle rests on practical concerns of fair
notice and prevention of abuse of official discretion.91 These bases,
however, have been critiqued. When it comes to wrongful conduct, there
is arguably always fair notice of illegality. The courts' ability to interpret
the law broadly to reach "situations in which the community's sense of
security and propriety was deeply offended" is widely recognized.92
Furthermore, because of the relative ease of avoiding serious moral
wrongdoing, citizens cannot complain or claim undue surprise when just
criminal laws prohibiting such conduct are applied to them. Finally,
because of officials' ability to interpret general laws broadly, abuse of
discretion will remain an open possibility despite adherence to the legality
principle.93 A firmer basis for the doctrine is required.
The legality principle is better understood as ultimately resting on the
commitment to the rule of law. Under the rule of law, the state is not
simply a well-heeled vigilante with a monopoly on violence. Rather, it is
an entity that operates pursuant to a set of rules, norms, and practices
established through a logically prior set for identifying the former.94
Persons act in an official capacity-that is, as the state-rather than in a
private capacity when their acts are guided by the rules, norms, and
practices of the state.95 Officials, of course, have discretion in their
87. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (Stanford
University Press ed.1968).
88. See id.
89. JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 59 (2d ed. 1960).
90. While the principle flowered in 18th century liberalism, its threads may be traced back to
Roman jurisprudence. See Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47 YALE L.J. 165, 165-70 (1937).
91. See LOCKE, supra note 86, at 80.
92. Id. at 85.
93. Id. at 86.
94. See generally, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-107 (1961).
95. See ALON HAREL, WHY LAW MATTERS 126-28 (2014) (arguing that persons act in their private
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actions, but that discretion has been validated by prior legal authorization.
Therefore, the legitimate acts of the state are bounded by the rules it has
established for itself, whether these rules are publicly available or not.
When the state punishes, it does so based on conduct that has been defined
to trigger a punitive response. While the goal of the state may be to punish
wrongdoing per se, ultimately the state acts based on its determination
that one of its rules defining wrongdoing has been breached. Persons are
punished justly only for engaging in wrongful conduct, but persons are
punished legitimately only for breaking the law.96
In our legal system, it is the criminal laws-broadly construed to
include statutes, case law, and interpretive guides such as legislative
history-that determine the circumstances in which the state may
legitimately impose penal sanctions (nullum crimens, sine lege). For
example, if the state repeals the laws of assault and robbery, and Robert
thereafter takes Wally's wallet at gunpoint, under the legality principle
Robert may not be punished. Pursuant to legality, some wrongdoing may
go unpunished. Likewise, under the standard legality principle, the state
is limited in the punishments it may impose (nulla poena, sine lege). The
state may only impose punishments it has established with sufficient
precision beforehand.97 If the state has set the punishments for assault at
one weeks' imprisonment and robbery at two weeks' imprisonment, two
weeks' imprisonment is the maximum permissible imprisonment that
may be imposed on Robert. (Since every robbery entails an assault,98 the
penalty for assault is merged with that for robbery.99) Pursuant to the
legality principle, some criminal wrongdoing may go inadequately
punished.
Finally, despite the requirement of precision in punishment
specification, the legality principle should not be construed to prohibit
criminal statutes that establish a sentencing range for a given offense. The
state, however, should be limited in selecting a sentence within the range
by its prior specification of the conduct that is prohibited. Imagine, for
example, that a state allows a judge to sentence a person for assault
anywhere from one to five years, and robbery from three to ten years.
capacity when acting "by force of circumstances" rather than in their official capacity which entails
deferring to judgments of the state concerning public good).
96. It is possible to imagine a group of people forming a society and creating a free-roaming
institution to punish (undefined) wrongdoing wherever it finds it. I would not view such as society as a
liberal democratic one operating under the rule of law.
97. Slightly more formally, the legality principle "means that an act can be punished only if, at the
time of its commission, the act was the object of a valid, sufficiently precise, written criminal law to which
a sufficiently certain sanction was attached." Claus Kress, Nulla Poena Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, available at
https://opil.ouplaw.com/home/mpi.
98. See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 211.1, 222.1 (1985).
99. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1)(a) (1985).
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Assume a fair interpretation of this legislation is that the legislature
believes that the wrong of assault is the violation of the right of physical
security and that robbery involves an assault that also violates the victim's
interest in property (hence the higher penalty range). The state then
repeals the robbery law, but not the assault law. Assume a fair
interpretation is that the legislature has decided that property interests are
better protected, and their violation remedied, through tort or other forms
of civil law. Then, Robert takes Wally's wallet, but uses relatively little
force. Under the legality principle, Robert should receive a relatively light
sentence for assault; say, two years. To impose a five-year sentence based
on Robert violating Wally's property interests would offend the legality
principle as much as punishing Robert for violating Wally's property
interests in the example of the previous paragraph, where both assault and
robbery were repealed. In neither case did the legislature criminalize the
violation of a particular interest. Thus, the legality principle may require
that wrongful aspects of prohibited conduct to go unpunished just as it
may require wrongful acts to go unpunished. The scope of legitimate
punishment all depends on what interests the state has in fact criminalized
prior to the wrongdoer's act.
C. Criminal Wrongs
The third step is to argue that, by and large, the interests protected by
our criminal laws are not subjective, comparative, or remote. Rather, they
are objective, baseline-independent, and proximate. These are the
punishable aspects of the offender's wrongdoing.
1. Objective
First, in our legal system, crimes are almost always defined in objective
terms, criminalizing the violation of objectively defined interests. Theft,
as relevant, is unlawfully taking or exercising unlawful control over the
property of another.100 It is not a defense to the charge of car theft that the
owner never became aware that the taken car was missing or that the car's
being taken never frustrated any of the owner's desires. Perhaps in a state
of nature, taking a car, the absence of which was never noticed or never
minded, would not be worthy of punishment because it didn't negatively
affect the owner's well-being. But our society, through its laws, has
recognized property rights. Laws against theft criminalize the violation of
these rights. The violation of these rights is the wrong of theft. Likewise,




a battery is the causing of bodily injury to another.101 It is not a defense to
the charge of battery that the knife jabbed in the victim's leg (a) caused
no pain because of the victim's prior nerve damage, or (b) that the jab,
although unconsented to, was welcome because of the victim's
psychological obsession with cutting. Perhaps in a state of nature, pain-
causing or unwelcomeness would be the aspect of battery that would
make it a wrongdoing, but our society has come to recognize a right
against physical contact analogous to a right against interference with
property. People have a right to uncompromised bodily integrity, and, for
the purposes of the law, the subjective effects of a battery are neither here
nor there.
Inchoate offenses provide an additional example of offenses grounded
in the violation of objectively defined interests. Inchoate offenses may be
committed without the subjective awareness of any would-be target and
need not negatively impact any person's subjective well-being. The firing
of a gun may be attempted murder even if the discharged bullet flies into
the sea, missing its intended victim by a wide mark and, even though,
because of a silencer, the would-be victim never became aware of the
attempt. Where is the wrongdoing? Objective theories of attempts
postulate the violation of an objective right of the intended target not to
be placed at risk or not to be subject to attack.1 02 According to these
theories, our criminal law of attempts reflects the existence of such rights.
Concededly, among retributivists, there is debate regarding the nature of
the wrongdoing that justifies punishment for attempts. In contrast to
objective theories, so-called subjective theories locate the wrong of a
criminal attempt in the actor's acting on the unjustified intent to cause the
harm associated with the completed offense or the intent itself.103 In
neither objective nor subjective theories, however, is the wrongdoing
underlying inchoate offenses a matter of causing another person
subjective harm. When it comes to inchoate offenses, subjective harm is
neither here nor there.
101. See LAFAVE, supra note 100, § 16.2 (listing bodily injury or offensive touching as an element
of battery); MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1985) (listing "bodily injury" as an element of simple assault).
102. The idea that risk imposition is analogous to harm creation has been explored by Claire
Finkelstein, who defends the claim that exposure to risk is itself a harm. Claire Oakes Finkelstein, Is Risk
a Harm?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 963, 973 (2003). According to Finklestein, "[A]gents have a legitimate
interest in avoiding unwanted risks." Id. at 966. An analogous approach is taken by Larry Crocker. He
takes the position that an act can be wrongful by virtue of the objective risk it imposes on society.
Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41 EMORY L.J. 1059 (1992). On this assumption,
he argues that "an offense creating a risk of 1/n of concrete harm h imposes a harm of h/n." Id. at 1084.
103. See, e.g., Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319, 321 (1996)
("Culpability could thus be said to be wrongdoing in a sense"). For an example of subjective retributivism
(not to be confused with the subjective theory of punishment of Kolber and others), see Larry Alexander,
Crime and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994).
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2. Base-Line Independent
Second, in our legal system, comparative considerations are not the
measure of criminal wrongs; the victim's counterfactual and historic
baselines are not relevant. For example, if a person agrees to be kicked in
the derriere by a friend (say, as an agreed consequence for losing a bet),
and another person, at the last moment, restrains the friend and delivers
the kick herself, the kicker may not avoid a charge of battery on the
ground that she did not cause a physical contact relative to the victim's
baseline of physical contact (that is, an equal kick would have occurred
anyway). Similarly, if A and B, acting independently, simultaneously
shoot C, A and B will each be guilty of homicide, assuming each shot
would have been sufficient to kill C.104 C's baseline life expectancy-per
hypothesis zero given the other shot-would be irrelevant.
This principle of baseline independence is not limited to rare cases of
duplicate causation. When it comes to intentional unprovoked killings,
we have a single crime-murder. It is possible to imagine a set of distinct
criminal offenses for depriving a person of different number of years of
life. ("Murder-1 is depriving another of 80-100 years of life." "Murder-2
is depriving another of 59-79 years of life." Etc.) That however is not our
system. The law of homicide is based on the idea that the wrong of killing
is the violation of the right to life. All lives are deemed of equal value and
every violation of the right to life of any person is equally wrongful. 10 5
The victim's baseline life expectancy (or baseline life quality) is irrelevant
in measuring the wrong. Likewise, a person is liable for kidnapping if he,
with appropriate motive, forcibly interferes with another's liberty of
movement.106 A victim's baseline of movement is irrelevant. It is no
defense that a bound victim was planning on remaining in a chair for 24
hours or that an adducted victim was planning on leaving the state
anyway. It is being placed in an absolutely defined state of restricted
autonomy that is the wrong of kidnapping.
The matter is somewhat more complicated with respect to property
crimes. Arson is commonly defined as the purposeful destruction of a
building or occupied structure of another. 10 7 The harm of arson is the
104. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, § 203, at 258-59.
105. Some jurisdictions have higher penalties for killing of children or the elderly. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. 5-10-101(a)(9) (permitting death penalty in some cases of knowingly causing the death of a
person under 14). Such enhanced penalties, I believe reflect only a legislative belief that the young and
elderly are more vulnerable than others, and so are more in need of protection than others. Such penalties
do not reflect a legislative determination that the live of the young and the elderly are more valuable than
others. Since the young and the elderly have very different life expectancies, any enhanced penalties for
their killing does not reflect that the wrong in killing is a function of life expectancy.
106. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 212.1 (1985).
107. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1(1)(a) (1985).
652 [VOL. 89
OBJECTIVE PUNISHMENT
deprivation of shelter. It does not matter whether a mansion or shack was
destroyed. In either case the victim is reduced to a state of homelessness.
The victim's "housing baseline" is thus irrelevant. In contrast, the offense
of theft is commonly graded. Stealing $5,000 might be a higher degree of
theft than stealing $500.108 The change in wealth from the victim's pre-
theft baseline to her post-theft state can be thought of as the harm of theft.
However, it is not a higher degree of larceny to steal $5,000 from a person
with $10,000 total wealth than to steal the sum from a person with
$1,000,000 total wealth. Because of the decreasing utility of the marginal
dollar, the former theft has a greater impact on the victim's overall
finances than the latter. Nevertheless, the criminal law ignores wealth
effects because the wrong of theft is not understood as the effect of the
taking on the victim's overall finances or on the victim's overall set of
objective opportunities (or subjective reaction to the loss of the stolen
item). A $5000 loss is a $5000 loss. As will become important when the
focus returns to the punishment deserved for theft, the victim's financial
baseline is irrelevant to the wrong of theft.
Our tort and contract systems, as Kolber points out, measure damages
relative to the victim's or contracting parties' counterfactual or historical
baselines.109 Thus harms in these areas of law are understood
comparatively. But neither of these fields are animated by principles of
retributive justice. It would make no more sense to look to them for an
understanding of harm than it would to look to the criminal laws of other
jurisdictions. Our criminal law defines what we are being punished for.
Thus, these are the proper laws to examine to determine the norms of
wrongdoing which are to guide the norms of punishment.
3. Proximate
Third, in our legal system, criminal wrongs do not include all the harms
that result from an act, in the "but-for" sense. Rather, principles of
proximate causation limit the scope of harms that the actor might be
criminally responsible for. The wrongs that actors may be criminally
punished for are just those that are proximately caused.110 Moreover,
proximate causation is not simply a matter of foreseeability, understood
as empirical predictability. Proximate cause is a complicated, highly
normative notion. For example, if an actor steals the car of another in a
bad part of town, and it is predictable that as a result the car owner, left
without a means to leave the area, will be mugged by a local gang, the car
108. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2) (1985).
109. Kolber, Comparative Punishment, supra note 3.
110. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03 (1985); LAFAVE, supra note 100, § 6.04(c)-(g).
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thief will not be liable as an accomplice to the assault.i Likewise, not all
benefits resulting from the criminal act are legally relevant. Even if it is
predictable that the victim of a high-profile sexual assault will write a
highly profitable best seller about the assault resulting in a net
improvement in the victim's life, this cannot be raised as a legal
justification (or even a partial legal justification) of the offense.
In sum, when it comes to protecting interests and assessing wrongs, the
criminal law is largely objective, base-line independent and proximately
based.
D. Pay-Off
Thus far, the Article has argued for the following points: (1) under
retributivism, construed pursuant to lex talionis, punishments to the extent
possible should reflect the abstract features of the wrongs being punished
for; (2) under the legality principle, the wrongs being punished for are
limited to the violation of interests that have been protected by the
criminal law in effect at the time of the act, and (3) the interests our society
has protected through the criminal law are, abstractly characterized,
violations of objective, absolute and proximate interests. From these
points, it directly follows that the punishments criminals retributively
deserve should be defined in objective, absolute and proximate terms.
Incarceration, entailing the subjecting of an offender to an environment
of minimal liberty for a fixed period regardless of idiosyncratic features
of the offender, is such a punishment.
It may be useful to restate the overall argument with the component
points ordered somewhat differently. In a liberal society, there are two
constraints on what conduct may qualify for criminal punishment. First,
the conduct must be wrongful, that is, it must set back (or at least risk
setting back) an interest of another that the other has a moral right not to
have set back. Conduct violating another's interest in physical integrity
might count; setting back another's interest in establishing a romantic
relationship with the actor might not. Second, the conduct must have been
criminalized prior to its commission by a legitimate political authority,
typically a legislature. Such an authority need not criminalize every
wrongdoing or every aspect of a given wrongdoing. A legislature, for
example, might choose to protect through the criminal law an individual's
interest in bodily integrity or in security of property, but not an
individual's interest in their reputation or their being told the truth. Once
these legally protected interests are established, punishment for their




violation should meet the demands of retributive justice and meet
associated moral constraints. Thus, consistent with practical
considerations and perhaps other moral values, such as mercy, the
punishment should reflect, at a suitable level of abstraction, the nature and
extent of the violated interests that provide the grounds for the
punishment. The interests that our society has chosen to protect through
the criminal law are, by and large, (1) objectively defined interests, (2)
measured in absolute terms, and (3) limited to those proximately violated
by the actor's conduct. Thus, these are the interests that should be set back
by punishment. Accordingly, the same conclusion as above is reached:
Incarceration, entailing the subjecting of an offender to an environment
of minimal liberty for a fixed period regardless of idiosyncratic features
of the offender, is a retributively just form of punishment.
The nature of the argument presented above may be clarified by
describing its limits. I do not claim that individualized retributivism (that
is, a version of retributivism assessing punishment in subjective,
comparative or nonproximate terms) is inconsistent, incoherent or
flagrantly counter to our moral intuitions. If, contrary to fact, the political
institutions of our land had chosen to criminalize conduct causing
subjective, comparatively measured suffering of others without regard to
proximity, the appropriate retributive response would be to impose on
offenders similar subjective suffering measured comparatively without
respect to proximity limitations (assuming that such conduct was indeed
wrongful). Such a system, however, is not ours. In our system, the
wrongful conduct that the state has chosen to criminalize is
overwhelmingly the proximate deprivation of objective liberties
measured in absolute terms. Accordingly, the appropriate retributive
response is a proportionate deprivation of comparable liberties: objective
punishment.
1. Some Implications
The foregoing argument for objective punishment has a number of
implications. First, happily, it solves the "Paris Hilton Problem." The
retributivist is under no obligation to reduce Paris Hilton's sentence on
the subjectivist ground that she will have a tougher time in prison than
most because she cannot live without her luxuries, and on the
comparativist ground that going to prison would deprive her of more
objective liberties, like her planned exotic vacation, than others.
Likewise, this argument relieves the retributivist of the obligation to
increase the sentence of an offender from an impoverished background
on the ground that he would not find prison a particularly distressing place
and would be deprived of relatively few liberties since he had only a
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limited set to begin with. Likewise, there is no duty to decrease the
punishment of the offender who, as a result of his incarceration, has
deeply reflected on right and wrong and has thereby become a better, and
in the long run, more content person. There are no such duties because,
under objective retributivism, the only duty is to punish proportionately
and the subjective, comparative and proximate effects of incarceration are
not part of the punishment. They are merely consequences, or side-effects,
of the punishment.
Second, objective retributivism explains some of our current penal
practices. If Young and Old commit murders for which they are equally
blameworthy, Young cannot complain that it would be unfair for the state
to execute both on the ground that Young would thereby be deprived of
more years of life than Old. As argued above,1 1 2 the wrong of killing, as
recognized by our criminal legal system, and indeed in all others, is the
violation of the right to life, not the reduction in the number of years lost
from the victim's life expectancy baseline. First degree murder is not
depriving of 100 to 80 years of life, etc. Accordingly, it is just to impose
on Young and Old the same absolute harm of termination of life.113
Third, objective retributivism suggests reasonable solutions of
controversial issues. For example, to what extent should the impact of a
sentence on the offender's family be taken into account? This is the
question of the proximate cause boundaries of punishment. The analysis
thus far suggests that the law should be guided here by its practices when
determining the scope of the wrongdoing. If, for example, in the case of
a serious assault, judges at a sentencing hearing are to take into account
the impact of the assault on the victim's family, judges should also take
into account the impact of a potential sentence on the offender's family.
The boundaries of the wrong should inform the boundaries of the
punishment. A similar analysis should apply to the question of whether
an offender should be entitled to enjoy the profits of a book he writes in
prison concerning his experiences in prison. The analysis thus far suggests
that the answer to this question should be guided by whether the state
would take as a factor mitigating an offender's wrongdoing the victim's
deriving profits from a book he writes about the crime.114 Since the latter
is likely not the case, the offender should be entitled to book profits, much
as he should be entitled to whatever psychological profits or character
improvements he extracts from the experience of prison.
Fourth, and most importantly for the issues addressed in this Article,
112. See supra text accompanying note105.
113. As discussed previously, see supra text accompanying note 81, retributive notions of justice
may be tempered by other values. The death penalty, for example, might be rejected based on dignity
concerns.
114. See supra text accompanying note 110.
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under objective retributivism, crime and punishment may be
proportionate despite variations among offenders. This result follows
from the fact that both crime and punishment are understood in objective,
absolute and proximate terms. Other factors, such as subjective sensitivity
or insensitivity, pre-punishment baseline, and factors outside the
boundaries of proximate cause (such as assaults by other inmates) are not
part of the punishment. Thus, they cannot render disproportionate
punishments which are proportionate in objective, absolute, and exclusive
terms.
2. Some Possible Objections
Kolber raises some objections to the objective version of retributivism.
I respond below.
First, Kolber argues that objective theories, insofar as they identify
punishment with the loss of liberty, are contrary to the ordinary meaning
of punishment. Kolber writes that if people are asked why they would not
want to be in prison, they will probably cite the unpleasant experiences
they expect to have there (e.g., they would be sad, scared, and lonely)
more than they would reference the loss of liberty in the abstract.1 15 True,
it would be unusual to respond to the question, "Why would you not want
to be in prison," with "Because I wouldn't be able to leave and live my
normal life." But this is because that response is too obviously true, not
because it is false. If asked whether they would mind going to prison if
they could take a pill that prevented all sadness, fear, and loneliness that
would be caused by prison, most people still likely would say no because
of the objective interference with their normal lives and relationships.
Second, Kolber considers the example of an inmate, "Coma," who is
sentenced to a ten-year term, spends those ten years in a coma, and
wakens at the end of his prison term. Kolber suggests it would make no
sense from a retributivist perceptive to say that Coma has gotten the
punishment he deserves. Kolber infers from this that our retributivist
sentiments focus on negative subjective experience to which Coma was
clearly not subjected.1 16 Gray counters that i would be absurd to take time
off for sleep, or greater than average sleep, challenging the notion that
Coma has received insufficient punishment. In Gray's view, knowledge
of an objective deprivation is required, even if not suffering.1 17 But does
knowledge require conscious awareness or will latent knowledge1 18
115. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 203.
116. Id. at 204.
117. Gray, Punishment as Suffering, supra note 59, at 1674-75.
118. A person might be said to have latent knowledge of a fact, such as the fact that Christopher
Columbus discovered America in 1492, even when not thinking about he matter if disposed to affirm the
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suffice? Will one or the other be absent during periods of daydreams,
sleep or coma? If so, should the sentence be adjusted accordingly? And
how does a knowledge requirement fit into objective theories? Gray does
not explain.
In my view, we should be guided by the idea, grounded in lex talionis,
that norms of punishment should reflect the objective norms of
wrongdoing. Albert plans to forcibly rape Betty. Just before Albert acts,
however, Betty accidentally overdoses on a self-administered drug and so
is unconscious when Albert rapes her. Even though Betty was
unconscious and did not subjectively experience the rape, our criminal
laws recognize that Albert seriously wronged her. Likewise, Coma's lack
of consciousness is not material per se. Rather, our hesitancy to say that
Coma has gotten the punishment he deserves stems from the fact that it is
not clear that Coma has been subject to even objectively defined
punishment. If Carl commits a serious crime and is sentenced to 10 years
living a middle-class lifestyle in a suburban home, Carl has not received
the punishment he deserves. This is not because, as a subjective matter,
Carl likely does not mind the objective conditions that have been imposed
on him. Rather it is because regardless of Carl's feelings about his
sentencing conditions, the conditions being imposed are no different than
the typical conditions of the average member of our society. His
"punishment" is an objective one; it just happens to be excessively
lenient. The same holds for Coma. While unconscious, Coma, we may
imagine, is in a medical facility-either on or off the prison campus-
connected to a respirator and feeding tubes, monitored and nursed as
necessary. The conditions he is subjected to are no different than the
conditions that an average member of our society would be in if in a coma.
Thus, his objective punishment is excessively lenient, and so
disproportionate to his wrongdoing. From an objective perspective, Coma
has not gotten the punishment he deserves. Compare Sleepy, an offender
who sleeps an average of nine hours a day during the course of his
imprisonment. In my view, Sleepy's prison term need not be lengthened
on account of his above-average slumbers. This is because, looking at
Sleepy's overall circumstances, we would say that Sleepy is being subject
to a state of confinement 24-hours a day and is never experiencing
objective conditions of freedom comparable to those of an ordinary
citizen. Assuming that 10 years' imprisonment is proportionate to his
wrongdoing, Sleepy has received the punishment he deserves.
Third, Kolber argues that "one must consider subjective responses to
punishment when deciding which liberty deprivations to use as
punishment. The kinds of liberty deprivations that can constitute
fact under the appropriate circumstances.
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punishments must be deprivations that the offender finds aversive."119
According to Kolber, depriving an opera hater of access to opera
intuitively does not count as punishment. Thus, Kolber infers, punishment
is a matter adverse reaction. But this inference is no more sound than the
inference that criminal wrongs are a matter of adverse reactions. It is
illegal to threaten to assault a person if he goes to the opera even if the
person, being an opera hater, never intended to go. To constitute a crime,
it is sufficient that the person has suffered an objective deprivation that,
abstractly characterized, typically produces an adverse reaction. The
effect on any particular person is irrelevant. We still think the subject of
the deprivation has been wronged. As argued earlier, the norms that
inform criminal wrongdoing should inform the norms of criminal
punishment.
Fourth, Kolber argues that "[t]hose who defend an objective account
of punishment must be able to describe why some punishments are more
severe than others."12 0 Kolber asks whether being confined to a small cell,
even in objective terms, is a greater deprivation of liberty than being
confined in a large one given that there are some things that can be done
in a small cell that cannot be done in a large one "like climb up the walls
of a prison cell by pressing one's legs against parallel cell walls."121 "We
cannot determine the value of a particular freedom without knowing how
that freedom affects the life experiences of human beings. And even if we
know how the activities affect a typical person, the objectivist will have
to explain why we should apply an analysis developed for typical people
to some actual human being about to be punished."12 2 But, for an
objectivist, severity determinations are not as difficult as Kolber suggests.
By far the two most prominent variables in sentences are duration of
confinement and amount of fine. Sentence duration and fine size are
highly monotonic across individuals. The longer the sentence, the longer
the liberty deprivations, and the greater the severity of the sentence.
Likewise, the greater the fine, the greater the deprivation in spending
power, and the greater the severity of the sentence. Sentence l ngth and
fine size are highly monotonic across individuals. While there may be
variations in prison conditions-some prisons, for example, deprive
inmates of access to natural sunlight more than others-such variations
are relatively small and should be minimized as much as they can be. As
discussed later, achieving retributivist goals must be traded off, to some
extent, with practical considerations and costs since retributive justice is
not the only thing of value in the world.
119. Kolber, Subjective Experience, supra note 3, at 204 (original emphasis omitted).
120. Id. at 205.
121. Id. at 206.
122. Id. at 206-07.
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E. Justifying Individualized Aspects of Punishment
The final step in my argument concerns Kolber's claim that
retributivists must give up the claim to proportionality or accept
counterintuitive modifications of our sentencing practices, such as
sentence reductions for offenders like Paris Hilton, who would have a
greater than average negative subjective response to incarceration. Under
objective retributivism, however, this dilemma need not be faced. As
discussed, under objective retributivism, the punishment imposed by our
criminal justice system are viewed in objective, absolute and proximate
terms. So viewed, punishments are largely proportionate to desert
(murderers get harsher sentences than rapists, rapists get harsher
sentences than thieves, etc.). The subjective, comparative, and remote
aspects of punishment that Kolber focuses on are, under objective
retributivism, not components of punishment that must be meted out
proportionately, but rather the side effects of the objective imposition of
circumstances of limited liberty, which is the actual punishment.
Still, even if they are merely side effects of punishment, the subjective
and comparative aspect of punishment are foreseeable effects and
something must be said about why the state is justified in causing them.
After all, as Kolber points out, even if punishment is defined narrowly to
include only intentionally caused harms, ultimately what must be justified
is what the state does-the "practice of punishment"-which produces
unintentionally caused harms.12 3
Kolber discusses the strategy of justifying the practice of punishment
by "splitting" the harms it produces into two parts: the first part, the
intended harms, might be strictly referred to as the punishment harms, to
be retributively justified, and the second part, the unintended harms,
which might include some subjective, comparative and remote harms, to
be supplementally justified. With respect to the latter set of harms, Kolber
imagines that either a retributive or a consequentialist justification might
be advanced.12 4 As discussed below, however, retributivists, in justifying
the unintended aspects of punishment, need resort to neither
consequentialist justifications nor retributivist justifications for these
harms as a proportionate reflection of the wrong done to others. Rather,
the justification of these harms is derived from the traditional retributivist
justification of the intended harms.
1. Derivative Justification
In general, there are two ways to justify the causing of a state of affairs
123. See Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 3, at 14-15.
124. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 3, at 23-26.
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that, considered in isolation or in light of past events, is intrinsically
disvaluable: The state of affairs might be justified in light of the suitably
valuable consequences it generates, or the state of affairs might be
justified in light of it itself being a consequence derived from a suitably
valuable state of affairs. The causing of individualized harms to the
subject of criminal sanctions may be justified in the latter derivative
manner. 125
Consider this example: Abel has a bike and Baker has a laptop. Baker
uses his laptop to access the internet and social media. It is foreseeable
that without it, Baker would experience isolation, boredom, and
depression. If Abel maliciously takes Baker's laptop, Abel would be
morally and legally responsible for Baker's resulting psychological harm.
Abel caused the harm without justification or excuse. If sued in tort, Abel
would be obliged to compensate Baker for such derivative losses. 126 In
contrast, imagine Baker agrees to trade his laptop computer for Abel's
bike. Under these circumstances Abel may justly take the laptop even if
it is foreseeable that Baker will suffer isolation, boredom and depression.
Furthermore, having taken the laptop and caused Baker emotional
distress, Abel would be under no moral obligation to mitigate it. As this
demonstrates, whether Abel acts wrongly or rightly in taking the laptop
computer determines the scope of his responsibilities vis-a-vis the
consequences of the taking. Broadly speaking, you are responsible for the
consequences of the wrongs you do others, but not the consequences of
the "rights" (the permissible acts). In the language of justification, the
justification of Abel's causing Baker emotional distress by taking the
laptop computer after the agreed trade is simply that, having agreed to the
trade (and fulfilled his obligation by giving Baker the bike), Abel had
better things to do with the laptop computer than let it remain in Baker's
possession. The justification of the foreseeable consequences caused by
the exercise of a right of possession derives largely from the right of
possession itself.
A closer example to this Article's topic arises in the context of
corrective justice. Imagine that now Abel owns a laptop. Baker takes
Abel's laptop computer without Abel's consent and quickly grows
psychologically dependent on the access it gives him to the internet and
social media. Abel sues Baker in tort and receives a judgment allowing
him to reclaim the laptop. It is foreseeable that Abel's reclaiming the
125. A similar approach is taken by Walen. See Walen, Retributive Justice, supra note 80, § 4.3.3
("unintended differences in suffering ... can justifiably be caused if (a) the punishment that leads to them
is itself deserved, (b) the importance of giving wrongdoers what they deserve is sufficiently high, and (c)
the problems with eliminating the unintended differences in experienced suffering are too great to be
overcome.").
126. See Lance Prods., Inc. v. Commerce Union Bank, 764 S.W.2d 207 (Tenn. App. 1988)
(allowing for emotional damages based on malicious acts of conversion).
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laptop will result in Baker's suffering emotional distress because Baker
will no longer have access to the internet and social media. Abel is
justified in reclaiming the laptop and thereby causing Baker emotional
distress on the ground that reclaiming the laptop is an act licensed by
principles of corrective justice and Baker's emotional distress is a direct
consequence of that act. The justification of inflicting foreseeable harms
largely derives from the corrective justice right to restitution.
Furthermore, Abel would be under no particular obligation to mitigate the
distress Baker might suffer as a result of exercising his corrective justice
right of restitution.
The situation is no different when it comes to retributive justice. The
imposing of a sentence of a term-of-years incarceration is a just act (under
the theory developed here) as it subjects an offender to an objective
deprivation of liberty abstractly reflecting the objective wrongs he
culpably caused a victim. The individualized harms that he may
experience are justified analogously to the subjective harm of emotional
distress suffered by Baker in the examples above. The emotional distress
is not the foreseeable consequence of a wrongful act by the state, which
the state would be required to mitigate. Rather, it is the consequence of
an act affirmatively licensed by retributive justice from which it derives
its justification. No further justification is needed.
2. Residual Obligation
This is not to say that the suffering of those in prison is without moral
significance. The state has a limited obligation to mitigate the suffering
of those it has incarcerated. It bears this obligation, however, not by virtue
of having incarcerated an offender. Rather it bears the obligation by virtue
of the fact the offender is a citizen and the state has a general obligation
to give equal respect to the needs and interests of all its members.12 7 Thus,
the state may be obliged to provide drugs or therapy if an incarcerated
offender suffers from claustrophobia or PTSD as an instance of its general
obligation to try to mitigate these maladies. (Because PTSD is often the
result of service in the armed forces, the state may have a stronger
obligation, all things equal, to mitigate its effects than those of other
psychological maladies.) Furthermore, because the state will have greater
knowledge of the distress of those in the prison population than those in
the general population, and because its greater proximity and control over
members of the prison population might make mitigating the various
forms of mental distress more cost effective, the state might be obliged to
127. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY chs. 6, 9, 12 (1977); RONALD
DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY (2002).
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attend to members of the prison population before members of the general
population. But, as a general matter, when it comes to the mental distress
of those incarcerated, the state should view it similarly as it would the
mental stress of those outside of prison. The two groups have different
degrees of freedom, but neither group suffers an unjust restraint on its
freedom. 128
Likewise, a court may be faced with the question whether a sentence
reduction is appropriate for an offender who, because of personal
characteristics, is more likely to be assaulted in prison than the average
offender.129 In such a case, the state would have an obligation to respond
to the foreseen risk of assault to the offender, just as it has an obligation
to protect all citizens from crime. But, realistically, such a response might
not be sufficient to eliminate the risk, just as, given the state's limited
resources, awareness of risks of crime does not ensure prevention of
crime. Crime in prison is thus no different in kind than crime outside of
prison. Both are serious wrongs which a potential victim may have a claim
to state resources to avert. Critically, however, offenders being sentenced
or offenders who have been the victim of crime in prison would have no
claim to having their sentences reduced in light of their foreseeable or
actual victimization. This position is contrary to that of Kolber who thinks
that under retributivism, the unintended aspects of a sentence should be
credited to the offender against his "desert debt." 130 Being the victim of a
crime while imprisoned, however, can no more serve as a get-out-of-jail-
sooner card for an inmate than being a victim of a crime outside of prison
can serve as one for some future unrelated offense.
3. Possible Objections
Three possible responses to my analysis are considered below.
First, it might be said that the argument above is circular insofar as it
purports to justify the consequences of an act based on the permissibility
of the source act. Does the argument thus improperly assume the
permissibility of the source act? Imagine a trolley is headed down a track
and will foreseeably hit and kill five workers unless the trolley is diverted
to a spur where it will kill one worker. In that case, it is usually considered
128. The same analysis applies to comparative harms. Many people in our society lack the ability
to take an exotic vacation through no fault of the state. A subset of this group are those who happen to be
unable to take exotic vacations because, through no fault of the state, they are incarcerated. The state has
no general obligation to make exotic vacations available to the subset than the group as a whole and so
need not provide any further justification for the deprivation.
129. State v. Blarek, 7 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd, 166 F.3d 1202 (2d Cir. 1998).
130. See Adam J. Kolber, The Subjectivist Critique of Proportionality, in THE PALGRAVE
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED ETHICS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 577 text accompanying n.9 (L. Alexander, K.
K. Ferzan, eds., 2019); Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 3, at 4.
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permissible to divert the trolley. Imagine now that after the trolley hits
and kills the one worker on the spur, it will continue along the spur and
hit and kill six workers. Clearly, the killing of the six workers cannot be
justified on the ground it was merely the consequence of diverting the
trolley-an otherwise permissible act. The reason it cannot be so justified
is that the purported initial justification of diverting the trolley was that it
was necessary to prevent the loss of a greater number of lives than it
caused the loss of. But when the six additional workers are considered,
that initial justification is no longer valid. Thus, the justification for
causing the death of the six workers cannot be derived from the
underlying permissibility of diverting the trolley when the six workers are
not considered. In contrast, when it comes to the justification of the state's
causing of individualized harms to those it incarcerates, the prima facie
permissibility of the incarceration based on the offender's objective desert
is not undermined by the individualized harms that occur as a
consequence. Despite these harms, the objective deprivation of liberty
suffered by the offender still mirrors the abstract features of the objective
wrongs he culpably caused a victim. Deriving the justification for causing
individualized harms from the retributive justness of the underlying
incarceration is no more circular than deriving the justification for causing
emotional distress to Baker from the corrective justness of the underlying
reclaiming of Abel's laptop-the example from the previous section.
Second, it may be objected that the state has a greater obligation to
mitigate the emotional distress experienced by those incarcerated than
those in the general population on the ground that it caused the former
(albeit with good reason) and not the latter. Supporting this objection is
the tort doctrine that those who innocently cause injury to another have a
duty to take reasonable measures to mitigate the injury. 13 1 This doctrine,
however, is not based on the moral principle that harm causers thereby
assume greater duties. Rather, the doctrine is best understood as resting
on practical considerations about the limits of the general no-duty-to-aid
rule. Recognizing a general duty to aid would be overly burdensome and
cause coordination problems among those affected by the duty. A limited
exception for harm-causers, however, can be accommodated. As
discussed previously, some practical factors, such as awareness of
emotional distress and control of the person experiencing it, may make
individualized harms of an offender easier to detect and less costly to
mitigate. But these factors do not include the state's causal responsibility
for the offender's incarceration.
Third, it may be claimed that even an unenhanced obligation to relieve
the mental distress of citizens may warrant a reduction in sentence of
131. See DAN B. DOBBS, ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 316 (2d ed. 2020).
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some or all offenders; little resources must be expended to provide this
form of mitigation. This claim cannot be ruled out in principle. Under
objective retributivism, the mental distress suffered by offenders as a
result of their incarceration may not be imposed by the state as part of
punishment and hence it is not intrinsically good. Whether such distress
should be mitigated through sentence reduction is like the question of
whether sentences generally should be reduced from what is deserved on
the ground that society's resources might be put to better use by, for
example, funding schools and arts, or even providing medication to those
in the general population who suffer from mental distress. Under
objective retributivism, there is value in punishing offenders based on
their desert, but it is not an absolute value. Trade-offs with other ends,
goals and values may have to be made. Sometimes the price of retributive
justice is too high, either on society or those subject to punishment. For
example, imagine a defendant who, after being convicted and sentenced
to a year in prison, but before beginning his sentence, suffers acute
respiratory failure requiring him to be on a ventilator if he is to live, and
no such device is available in any prison. 132 Prison would literally kill
him. In such circumstances, imposing the stated sentence, all things
considered, would not be justified. The price would be too high. Likewise,
in extreme cases, some trade-offs, between retributive justice and
subjective suffering should be made.
IV. RETRIBUTIVISM REDUX
Where does all of this leave retributivism? Objective retributivism, as
I have developed it, plays an important role in guiding our punishment
practices. It responds to the deeply entrenched feeling that wrongdoers
deserve to be subjected to the wrongs they have subjected others to.
Furthermore, it does so within the minimal restraints of legality that apply
to all liberal legal systems. It respects our intuitions that judges should not
reduce sentences for the sensitive or wealthy nor enhance sentences for
their opposites in the name of just punishment. It provides a basis for
derivatively justifying the individualized harms that punishment causes.
Finally, it allows the state to mitigate those harms as it might be led to if
the harms were experienced by those in the general population. Based on
this assessment, I reject Kolber's characterization of retributivism as
* "133anemic.
132. See Nora Shelly, She needs surgery to treat cancer, but judge gave her 10 months in prison
for $110 theft, USA TODAY (Feb. 4, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/02/04/lebanon-county-woman-needs-surgery-treat-
cancer-gets-prison-instead/4654516002/. .
133. Kolber, Unintentional Punishment, supra note 3, at 24.
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The ambitions of objective retributivism, however, are modest.
Objective retributivism is not an absolutist theory that insists on
proportionate punishment for every lawbreaker come what may, no
matter the cost or consequences. Nor does objective retributivism deny
the relevance of other values, such as dignity, mercy, equality or human
happiness. In particular, it allows that the requirements of retributive
justice may yield at some point when punishment would necessarily cause
excessive distress. Kolber writes, "If retributivists do not punish
proportionally because of financial costs, then they have not meaningfully
distinguished themselves from consequentialists who also give up on
proportionality whenever its benefits fail to justify its costs."134 But
allowing that costs and other consequentialist considerations can limit
punishment is consistent with preserving the core distinction between
retributivism and consequentialism. Retributivists reject the utilitarian
notion that individuals need not be considered as ends in themselves but
may be used to maximize the good of society as a whole. Allowing an
individual who needs a respirator to survive to avoid his full prison term
is not to use that person as a means to an end. Acknowledging
consequentialist considerations a  a constraint on retributivist justice is
different from recognizing consequentialist justifications as the core of
just punishment. Indeed, Kolber might make the same objection to any
moral theory that assigned a value to a state of affairs, such that financial
costs or other consequences could lead to the determination that, all things
considered, it should not be brought about. Objective retributivism is
distinct from consequentialist theories of punishment not because it
assigns an infinite value to deserved punishment, but because it assigns a
value to (or at least licenses) deserved punishment that consequentialism
fails to. Just as just punishment gives offenders their due, so objective
retributivism gives desert its due.
Finally, it should not be seen as a strike against objective retributivism
that it cannot specify with exactitude when the extreme point is reached
at which countervailing considerations, such as excessive hardship, call
for relaxing the claims of retributive justice. Moral theories can be divided
into deontological and consequentialist heories. Absolutist deontological
theories are implausible. The consequences of an act, if great enough,
must affect the all-things-considered determination of whether the act
should be undertaken.135 The demands of retributive justice must at some
point yield to consequences. Consequential theories, in turn, must weigh
alternative, seemingly incommensurate consequences. Even absolutist
134. Kolber, Comparative Punishment, supra note 3, at 1605.
135. As John Rawls has stated with uncharacteristic fervor, "All ethical doctrines worth our
attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be
irrational, crazy." JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE 30 (1971).
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theories like utilitarianism that proclaim, without qualification, that the
right act is the one with the greatest expected utility must somehow place
seemingly incommensurable states of affairs of a common scale of utility.
The difficulty for retributivists in specifying when individualized harms
become unacceptably high is indistinguishable from the difficulties
suffered by contending moral theories. Different moral theories may give
better and worse answers to difficult moral questions, but they cannot
escape the difficulty of the questions.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Kolber's writings have posed a formidable challenge to
retributivists. There is much in Kolber's writings to agree with. I agree
with his justification-symmetry principle that the state, in justifying its
punishment practices, must justify all the harms an individual engaging
in the same practices would have to justify. Likewise, I agree with his
claim that individualized harms to offenders should be measured when
practical to determine that they are not excessive. Likewise, I agree that
retributivists must give up the position that sentences are just only if the
full range of harms suffered by an offender as a result of the intended
sanction is proportionate to the offender's wrongdoing. Within the space
defined by these agreements, however, there is much room for theorizing.
This Article has attempted to show that objective retributivism is a
plausible desert-based theory that, in conjunction with other plausible
principles of moral and political philosophy, provides an illuminating
justification for our current punishment practices. In this manner, I hope
to have added my voice to the larger conversation concerning the
integration of first-order moral principles, such as retributivism, within
the activities and operations of the modern liberal state.
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